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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION OF SEGREGATIVE INTENT MAY BE
ESTABLISHED BY EVIDENCE OF FORESEEABLE CONSEQUENCES
Arthur v. Nyquist
In the landmark decision of Brown v. Board of Education,' the
Supreme Court held that state-imposed segregation in public
schools violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.2 Twenty years later the Court clarified the Brown hold-
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 Id. at 495. The fourteenth amendment provides that a state shall not "deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §
1. Its prohibitions reach the discriminatory application of laws which appear fair on their
face as well as laws which patently discriminate against minorities. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356 (1886); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). In determining whether
particular official action violates the equal protection clause, the Supreme Court utilizes a
"two-tier" test. See Schwemm, From Washington to Arlington Heights and Beyond: Discrim-
inatory Purpose in Equal Protection Litigation, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 961, 962. State action
"impermissibly interfer[ing] with the exercise of a fundamental right or operatfing] to the
peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class" is subject to strict judicial scrutiny. Massachusetts
Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976). Thus, in the absence of a "compelling
governmental justification" such action will be found unconstitutional. L. TRmE, AMmcE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1002 (1978); see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1970); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964). Where
fundamental rights or suspect classifications are not involved, state action simply must be
"rationally related to furthering a legitimate state interest" to be upheld. 427 U.S. at 312;
see Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970). Since education is not considered a
fundamental right, see San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 40-44 (1973);
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954); Schwemm, supra, at 963, in order to trigger strict
scrutiny of facially neutral official action in school segregation cases, it must be shown that
the challenged action invidiously discriminates on the basis of race. Id. at 964-65.
The constitutional vitality of dual school systems was predicated on the "separate but
equal" doctrine adopted by the Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). It
was believed that constitutional rights would not be violated if the races were granted equal
though separate treatment under the law. Id. at 551. Thus, so long as educational facilities
were equal in terms of tangible features, such as the condition of buildings, competency of
teachers and type of curricula offered, students could be educated in separate facilities. See,
e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951), rev'd, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
The vigor of this tenet was eroded as courts recognized that despite equality of tangible
factors, apartheid educational facilities at the graduate school level deprived individuals of
qualitative opportunities which only integrated education could provide. See, e.g., McLaurin
v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S.
629 (1950). See generally Read, Judicial Evolution of the Law of School Integration Since
Brown v. Board of Education, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 7, 8 (1975). Finding the same
considerations relevant to primary and secondary education, the Brown Court held that
"[sleparate educational facilities are inherently unequal" and deprive minority students of
the equal protection of the laws. 347 U.S. at 495. Noting the negative impact of separate
educational facilities on the psychological well-being of minority children, the Court stated
that such separation "generates a feeling of inferiority [in black children] that may affect
their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." Id. at 494.
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ing by declaring that only segregation resulting from intentional
governmental action-de jure segregation- 3 would be held to vio-
late the constitution.' The Court, however, offered little guidance on
the question of what constitutes segregative intent.5 Consequently,
3 De jure segregation has been defined by the Supreme Court to be "a current condition
of segregation resulting from intentional state action. . . ." Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413
U.S. 189, 205 (1973). Where dual school systems are required or permitted by statute, or
where racial separation results from school policy subtly designed to serve a "racially discrim-
inatory purpose," de jure segregation exists. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976);
413 U.S. at 208. Where separation of the races exists despite neutral legislative and adminis-
trative racial policy, and is produced by socio-economic factors beyond the control of govern-
mental units, there is de facto segregation. Id. at 222-23 (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). It is the presence of "purpose or intent to segregate" which the Constitu-
tion proscribes and which is the distinguishing factor between de jure and de facto segrega-
tion. Id. at 208 (emphasis in original).
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973). In Keyes, the parents of students
attending Denver public schools filed suit alleging that the Denver School Board created or
maintained segregated schools throughout the school system. Id. at 191. Finding that schools
in a section of the system were intentionally segregated, the district court ordered desegrega-
tion of that area. Id. at 192. The court, however, declined to order desegregation of the entire
school system based on its finding of de jure segregation in a portion of the system, requiring
instead that the plaintiffs independently establish intentional segregation in each part of the
system for which desegregation was sought. Id. at 193. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit affirmed this aspect of the district court's decision. Id. at 195. The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that "a finding of intentionally segregative school board actions in a mean-
ingful portion of a school system. . . creates a presumption that other segregated schooling
within the system is not adventitious," shifting the burden to school officials to show that
the "other segregated schools. . . are not also the result of intentionally segregative actions."
Id. at 208.
The idea of using "segregative intent" to identify impermissible segregation has been
severely criticized. In Keyes, Justice Powell argued that the concept of segregative intent is
not a reliable standard for measuring official conduct since it is "so nebulous and elusive an
element." Id. at 227 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Powell
also believes that the de jure/de facto distinction deviates from the mandate of Green v.
County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968), which imposed an affirmative duty on public officials
to establish "integrated school systems." 413 U.S. at 224-26 (Powell, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). A preferable test, according to Justice Powell, would be one that
merely inquires whether a school district is segregated to a "substantial degree," and then
shifts the burden to school officials to show that the school system is actually integrated. Id.
at 228 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For a discussion of the ramifica-
tions of the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation, see Note, Toward the
Elimination of De Facto Segregation in Public Schools, 20 CATH. LAw. 60 (1974).
5 See 413 U.S. at 233 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Note,
Reading the Mind of the School Board: Segregative Intent and the De Facto/De Jure
Distinction, 86 YALE L.J. 317, 318-20 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Reading the Mind of the
School Board]. Courts have had little difficulty in finding segregative intent where school
systems were segregated under mandate of state law. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). More recently, however, in cases where state
law was silent concerning separation of the races but school systems were nevertheless segre-
gated, see, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 423 U.S. 189 (1973), courts struggled to ascertain
whether that segregation was de facto or de jure. See Reading the Mind of the School Board,
supra, at 317-18.
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in attempting to apply the Supreme Court's directive the lower
federal courts developed differing legal standards against which evi-
dence of segregative intent was evaluated. While some courts re-
quired direct evidence of the decisionmaker's motivation,, others
allowed the plaintiff to rely on a presumption of segregative intent
arising from foreseeable segregative consequences. 7 Recently, how-
ever, the validity of the existing tests was cast in doubt by two
Supreme Court decisions which established that intent to segregate
may not be inferred solely from official action having a racially
disproportionate impact.8 In light of this authority, the Second Cir-
I See Husbands v. Pennsylvania, 395 F. Supp. 1107 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Soria v. Oxnard
School Dist. Bd. of Trustees, 386 F. Supp. 539 (C.D. Calif. 1974). The Husbands court
believed that a subjective standard was most in accord with the import of the decision in
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). The Husbands court stated that
the language and thrust of the entire Keyes opinion does not support the idea that
the Court meant to allow actions of schools officials to be held unconstitutional
without regard to the purpose or aim behind those actions, but simply on the basis
that those actions were taken voluntarily and with cognizance that they would not
reduce existing segregated conditions. Such a position would hold school officials
in violation of the Constitution for actions take [sic] solely for reasons of economic
or administrative feasibility, completely without any segregative desire or aim.
Such is not, we think, the position in which the court in Keyes meant to place school
officials.
395 F. Supp. at 1134; cf. Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 908 (1978) (Arlington Heights factors utilized to determine segregative intent in
housing discrimination suit). Likewise, in Soria, the district court adopted a highly subjective
standard to determine the presence of discriminatory motive. See 386 F. Supp. at 541. See
also Diaz v. San Jose Unified School Dist., 412 F. Supp. 310 (N.D. Calif. 1976).
' See, e.g., United States v. School Dist., 521 F.2d 530, 536 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 946 (1976); Hart v. Community School Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975).
Early decisions in the Fifth Circuit adopted a strictly objective standard, finding any official
action which has the foreseeable result of producing racial segregation to be unlawful. See,
e.g., Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School Dist., 467 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1972) (en
banc), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 922 (1973). This view appears to obscure the distinction between
*de jure and de facto segregation, however, in that all state action which causes racial segrega-
' tion, whether intentionally discriminatory or not, is deemed unconstitutional. For an excel-
lent discussion of the diverse tests used by the circuits to determine segregative intent, see
Reading the Mind of the School Board, supra note 5.
8 See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). In Davis, black applicants who had been
denied positions as police officers brought suit under the fifth amendment and 42 U.S.C. §
1981 (1976), alleging that police department recruitment examinations discriminated against
black applicants because a disproportionately large number failed the test and were excluded
on that basis. Id. at 232-33. The Supreme Court rejected the argument that disproportionate
impact alone could establish unlawful discrimination under the equal protection clause and
held that the plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted with "invidious discriminatory
purpose." 426 U.S. at 238-39. In setting forth the requirements necessary to establish a
violation of the equal protection clause, the Davis Court distinguished the standards applica-
ble under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976). Title VII,
designed to promote equal employment opportunity, proscribes "disparate treatment" of
minorities for constitutionally impermissible reasons and "disparate impact" against minori-
[Vol. 53:266
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cuit, in Arthur v. Nyquist,9 modified its standard10 by holding that
evidence of foreseeable consequences gives rise to a rebuttable pre-
sumption of segregative intent" which becomes conclusive if the
defendant fails to establish that its educational objectives could not
have been achieved by less segregative policies. 12
In Arthur, the parents of students attending Buffalo public
schools brought a class action suit against state and city officials,
alleging that the defendants intentionally created and maintained
racially segregated schools in the city of Buffalo. 3 The evidence
showed substantial concentrations of white and minority students
in separate schools at the elementary,, middle and high school lev-
els." The plaintiffs alleged that Buffalo school officals had pur-
ties of the discriminatory operation of facially neutral laws. International Bhd. of Teamsters
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977); see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
431 (1971). While proof of discriminatory motive is essential to establishing a disparate
treatment claim, such evidence is not required in suits brought for disparate impact. 431 U.S.
at 335 n.15. It was the showing of disproportionate impact required for the latter theory which
the Supreme Court distinguished from the standard applicable to discrimination cases
brought under the equal protection clause. See 426 U.S. at 238-39. Previous decisions by the
Court which indicated that an effect or impact standard was permissible in establishing a
claim of unconstitutional racial discrimination, see Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S.
451 (1972); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), were thereby rejected in Davis. 426
U.S. at 244-45. Thus, the mere existence of segregated schools in a community will no longer
suffice to make out a constitutional violation; rather, state policies and practices must evi-
dence "contrivance to segregate on the basis of race." Id. at 240 (quoting Wright v. Rockefel-
ler, 376 U.S. 52, 58 (1964)). In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens, pointed out that "the
line between discriminatory purpose and discriminatory impact is not nearly as bright, and
perhaps not quite as critical" as the Court's opinion suggested. 426 U.S. at 254 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
According to one authority,
[tihe Supreme Court's decision in Washington v. Davis that only purposeful racial
discrimination violates the equal protection clause marks the beginning of a new
era in civil rights law. Despite [the Court's] contention that this requirement was
supported by a century of precedent, the Court had never before determined
whether the discriminatory effect of official action alone would suffice to establish
racial discrimination for equal protection purposes.
Schwemm, supra note 2, at 1048.
The Court reaffirmed the Davis holding in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), decided the following term.
573 F.2d 134 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 179 (1978).
, See Hart v. Community School Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975); notes 20-22
and accompanying text infra.
" 573 F.2d at 142-43.
,2 Id. at 143.
'3 Id. at 137. Plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) and the fourteenth
amendment, alleging denial of equal protection of the law. Federal jurisdiction was invoked
under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976).
" See Arthur v. Nyquist, 415 F. Supp. 904, 914-23 (W.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd on reconsidera-
tions, 429 F. Supp. 206 (W.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 573 F.2d 134 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct.
179 (1978). In many schools, either caucasian or minority students represented well over 80%
of the enrollment. 415 F. Supp. at 916-23.
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posely established a dual school system by gerrymandering atten-
dance zones, siting new schools in a prejudicial manner, using
"optional attendance areas" and "language transfers" discriminato-
rily, and hiring and placing staff on a racist basis.15 The New York
State Commissioner of Education and the members of the State
Board of Regents were alleged to have intentionally contributed to
the segregation by failing to act more forcefully to eliminate the
racial imbalance that existed in the Buffalo school system.'6 Utiliz-
ing a foreseeable consequence standard to assess evidence of intent,
the district court held that both the city and state defendants inten-
tionally engaged in unconstitutional discriminatory conduct. 7
On appeal to the Second Circuit, the defendants challenged
both the legal standard applied by the district court to determine
the existence of segregative intent and the court's ultimate finding
1 415 F. Supp. at 911. In several instances, attendance zones in the school system were
drawn in ways that produced racially imbalanced school populations. 573 F.2d at 144. Op-
tional attendance areas were utilized in the Buffalo Public School System to allow students
to attend either the school in the attendance zone in which they resided or one in a contiguous
area. 415 F. Supp. at 924 n.23. This enabled white students to avoid attending predominantly
black schools. Id. at 939. In addition, language transfers were available so that students could
take special foreign language courses not offered in their own schools. Id. at 926. The evidence
indicated that language course offerings were instituted in some instances to prevent the
unnecessary transfer of students from a school and in other instances to enable students to
transfer out of predominantly black schools. Id. at 926-27.
"a 573 F.2d at 146. Department of Education intervention in Buffalo commenced in 1960
when the Board of Regents issued a policy statement urging desegregation of the Buffalo
Public School System. Through 1975, however, the city and state officials responsible for
educational policy failed to agree on a desegregation plan and no action was taken to desegre-
gate. The final attempt by the state to remedy the situation existing in Buffalo was in 1975
when the Commissioner of Education threatened to enforce his directives through statutory
provisions. Id. at 145.
'1 429 F. Supp. at 211-13. The district court's original finding of liability emphasized the
foreseeability of disproportionate impact, a standard established by the Second Circuit in
Hart v. Community School Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975). See 415 F. Supp. at 940.
Before appeal was taken, the lower court had the parties brief three newly-decided Supreme
Court cases germane to the topic of segregative intent. 429 F. Supp. at 207. See Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Austin Independent
School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976)(per curiam); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229 (1976). Issuing a supplemental opinion, the court stated that the three decisions rejected
the foreseeable consequence test when used to establish liability solely on the basis of foresee-
able segregative impact. Reevaluating the Hart standard, Judge Curtin reasoned that
mere cause and effect, mere analysis by way of a "reasonable and foreseeable
consequence" test which amounts to a finding that disproportionate impact is
sufficient to impose liability for school segregation under the fourteenth amend-
ment, . . . is refuted by Washington v. Davis and Arlington.
429 F. Supp. at 210; see notes 21 & 22 infra. Nevertheless, the district court concluded that
the foreseeable consequence standard was a valid method of evaluating evidence of intent.
Id. at 211.
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that such intent was shown. 8 Writing for a unanimous panel, 9
Judge Smith used, as a starting point, the "foreseeable conse-
quence" test promulgated by the Second Circuit in Hart v. Com-
munity School Board" to determine whether the requisite intent
was present. 2' The court interpreted the Hart standard to signify
11 573 F.2d at 136, 143. The defendants raised several issues on appeal. When the plain-
tiffs first brought suit, the defendants named in the complaint were the Buffalo Board of
Education and Superintendent of Schools, the Board of Regents of the University of the State
of New York and the State Commissioner of Education. 415 F. Supp. at 972. After trial on
the merits, the plaintiffs moved to add the individual members of the Buffalo Board of
Education and the Board of Regents as parties defendant. Id. at 973. The plaintiffs' motion
was made in response to the state defendants' contention that the court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over them, since school boards were not considered to be persons within the
meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). 415 F. Supp. at 972; see City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412
U.S. 507 (1973); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Monell v. Department of Social Servs.,
532 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978); U.S. CONST. amend. XI (states and
their agencies are immune from suit in federal courts). The district court granted plaintiffs'
motion. 415 F. Supp. at 911, 972.
On appeal, the Arthur court upheld the lower court's order reasoning that while city and
state agencies may be immune from liability under § 1983, their members are liable for
unconstitutional conduct under the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), when
sued in their official capacities for injunctive relief. Such individual members, moreover, are
"persons" within the meaning of § 1983. Monell v. Department of Social Servs. 532 F.2d 259
(2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978); Wright v. Chief of Transit Police, 527 F.2d 1262,
1263 (2d Cir. 1976). The defendants, however, argued that the district court did not have
jurisdiction over the board members since they were not added as parties defendant until
after trial on the merits and, for the most part, were not members of the board at the time of
the alleged unconstitutional acts. 573 F.2d at 139. Rejecting this argument, the Second
Circuit reasoned that since a board and its constituent members are the "same entity viewed
from different perspectives. . . they are freely interchangeable, for jurisprudential purposes,
before, during and after trial." Id. at 140. The court concluded that joining board members
as parties defendant following trial was merely the substitution of "equivalent parties" since
the board members were sued in their official capacities and not as individuals. 573 F.2d at
140 & n.7 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c), 21). Thus, proof at trial directed against the boards
constituted proof against its members in their official capacities. Id.
Shortly after the Second Circuit's decision in Arthur, the Supreme Court held that
''municipalities and other local government units [are] ... among those persons to whom
§ 1983 applies." Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2035 (1978). Reversing
the Second Circuit in Monell, the Supreme Court chose to overrule Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167 (1961) "insofar as it holds that local governments are wholly immune from suit under §
1983." 98 S. Ct. at 2022 (footnote omitted). The Court's decision was based on an exhaustive
review of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. See 98 S. Ct. at 2022-35. In
the Monell Court's view, Congress intended to include local governmental units within the
meaning of persons for § 1983 purposes. 98 S. Ct. at 2035. For an excellent discussion of
Monell, see Note Governmental Liability Under Section 1983 and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment After Monell, 53 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 66 (1978).
"1 The Arthur panel was composed of Chief Judge Kaufman and Judges Smith and
Mulligan.
512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975).
22 573 F.2d at 141-42. Hart was a class action suit brought by students who alleged that
local school board action resulted in the segregation of the junior high school they attended.
512 F.2d at 40. In Hart, the Second Circuit held that de jure segregation may be found to
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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:266
that a rebuttable presumption2 of intent arises when the plaintiff
establishes that segregative results were the natural and foreseeable
exist where governmental conduct foreseeably causes educational segregation. Id. at 50. In
essence, this test employs an impact standard in that it considers "lack of racial motivation
• . . irrelevant" if the "foreseeable effect" of state action is segregation. Id. at 51. Under this
approach, segregative intent and a finding of de jure segregation are premised solely on the
foreseeable impact of official conduct. See Note, Foreseeable Consequence Test for De Jure
Segregation, 50 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 329 (1975). See generally Perry, The Disproportionate
Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 540 (1977). This test is akin to
the tort theory that an individual is deemed to have intended the foreseeable consequences
of his acts. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 8 (4th ed. 1971). See also Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
The Hart court expressly refused to adopt a subjective standard to establish intent
because of the difficult evidentiary problems such an inquiry poses in evaluating the
"collective will" of school boards. 512 F.2d at 50. It was also believed that it may be unreason-
able to challenge the policy decision of a group on the basis of the personal beliefs of its
individual members. Id. The Hart court noted, moreover, that its foreseeable consequence
test was similar to the approach adopted by the Sixth Circuit in Oliver v. Michigan State
Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178, 182 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975). In finding
that the plaintiffs established a prima facie case, the Oliver court stated that when the
"foreseeable result of public officials' action or inaction" is segregation, a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the defendant acted with discriminatory purpose is created. Id. at 182.
Yet, the precise position taken by the Second Circuit in Hart is a matter of controversy.
Some commentators argue that the Hart test was strictly objective and failed to adequately
distinguish between de jure and de facto segregation. See, e.g., Reading the Mind of the
School Board, supra note 5, at 331 n.72; Note, Foreseeable Consequence Test for De Jure
Segregation, 50 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 329, 330 (1975). This interpretation apparently is premised
on the Hart court's reliance on the foreseeability of segregatory consequences and its state-
ment that actual racial motivation is unimportant once foreseeable racial impact is found.
See also 429 F. Supp. at 210. On the other hand, some commentators have focused on Hart's
approval of the foreseeable consequence test used by other circuits through which a rebuttable
presumption of intent is created. This approach is viewed to be an adequate means of assess-
ing evidence of intent since defendants are afforded an opportunity to rebut the presumption
by demonstrating that they in fact did not act with a discriminatory purpose. See, e.g., Note,
Intent to Segregate: The Omaha Presumption, 44 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 775 (1976) [hereinafter
referred to as Omaha Presumption].
22 A presumption has been defined as "a procedural rule requiring the court, once it
concludes that the 'basic fact' is established, to assume the existence of the 'presumed fact'
until the presumption is rebutted and becomes inoperative." J. MAGUIRE, J. WEINSTEIN, J.
CHADBURN & J. MANSFIELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 1046 (6th ed. 1973) [hereinafter
cited as MAGUIRE & WEINSTEIN]. When a presumption is created, a party's burden of proof is
satisfied, and the burden shifts to the opposing party to come forward with evidence sufficient
to overcome the presumption. See 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2487 (3d ed. 1940). Thus, "a
presumption is compulsory and prima facie establishes the fact to be true; it remains compul-
sory if it is not disproved." MAGUIRE AND WEINSTEIN, supra, at 1047.
The Supreme Court has recognized the utility of a presumption to establish discrimina-
tory intent. For example, in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971),
the Court found the continued existence of identifiably black or white schools in a statutorily
mandated dual school system to raise a presumption of racial discrimination in violation of
the equal protection clause. Id. at 18, 26. In Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973),
the Court utilized a presumption of illicit racial intent in a similar context. The Court stated
that
a finding of intentionally segregative school board actions in a meaningful portion
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consequence of governmental action.23 Judge Smith further clarified
the Second Circuit's approach by adding that this presumption be-
comes conclusive unless the school officials show that "no reasona-
ble alternative policy would have achieved the same permissible
educational goals with less segregative effect. '24 Upon reviewing the
recent Supreme Court decisions on the issue of segregative intent,
the Arthur court concluded that the modified Hart standard was
constitutionally sound.2
5
of a school system, . .. creates a presumption that other segregated schooling
within the system is not adventitious. It establishes . . . a prima facie case of
unlawful segregative design on the part of school authorities, and shifts to those
authorities the burden of proving that other segregated schools within the system
are not also the result of intentionally segregative actions.
Id. at 208. It should be emphasized, however, that in both Swann and Keyes a presumption
of intent was utilized as an evidentiary device only after a prior showing of intentional racial
discrimination had been made concerning the school systems in question. As formulated in
Hart and utilized in Arthur, on the other hand, "the foreseeable effects presumption facili-
tates an initial finding of segregative intent rather than amplifying the ramifications of a prior
finding." Omaha Presumption, supra note 21, at 789.
21 573 F.2d at 142. In utilizing a foreseeable consequence test, the court was cognizant of
the evidentiary difficulties facing plaintiffs in segregation suits. See id. Further, the Arthur
panel noted that the Supreme Court has recognized the difficulty in applying a subjective
approach to proving intent when dealing with governmental units. Id. For excellent discus-
sions of this problem, see Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of
Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REv. 95 (1971); Ely, Legislative and
Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970). At the same
time, the Arthur court observed that a completely objective standard should not be used to
establish segregative intent since it tends to obliterate the distinction between de jure and
de facto segregation by making any action, racially motivated or not, unconstitutional if its
segregative effects were foreseeable. 573 F.2d at 143.
24 573 F.2d at 142-43. In Hart, the court stated that "lack of racial motivation [is]
irrelevant in the face of. . . findings of foreseeable effect." 512 F.2d at 51. In addition, the
court did not indicate how, under its standard, the defendant could rebut a prima facie case.
Thus, the Arthur decision can be understood to clarify Hart by providing a standard for
defendants attempting to rebut the presumption of discriminatory intent.
2 See 573 F.2d at 143. Judge Smith reasoned that such an approach fulfilled the require-
ment of Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), that segregative intent, be the predicate
for a finding of unlawful conduct. 573 F.2d at 143. The Second Circuit concluded that the
test "is a cogent application of the Supreme Court's requirement of proof of segregative in-
tent, that it avoids conceptual pitfalls inherent in alternative approaches, and that it provides
a method of proof which is fair to both plaintiffs and defendants in cases of alleged unlawful
racial segregation." Id.
In arriving at its conclusion that a foreseeable consequence approach remained valid
following Davis and Arlington Heights, the Second Circuit had to reconcile its decision with
the Supreme Court's vacatur and remand of Austin Independent School Dist. v. United
States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976)(per curiam). In Austin, the Fifth Circuit had inferred discrimina-
tory purpose from the foreseeably segregative effect of utilizing a neighborhood school plan
in a residentially segregated community. United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 532 F.2d 380,
390 (5th Cir.), vacated and remanded per curiam sub nom. Austin Independent School Dist.
v. United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976). The Arthur court did not view the Supreme Court's
action in Austin as a complete rejection of the foreseeable consequence test when used alone
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Turning to the merits, the court found that the natural and
foreseeable consequence of the city official's conduct was increased
segregation. 2 Because there were reasonable alternative policies
available to the board which would have had a less segregative
effect, the court found that the prima facie case of de jure segrega-
tion had not been rebutted and affirmed the finding of liability as
to these defendants.27 On the other hand, the court held that the
state defendants dispelled what evidence of segregative intent ex-
isted as to them by showing that valid policy objectives justified
their failure to act more forcefully to remedy the situation.s
It is submitted that the legal standard promulgated by the
Arthur court is at odds with recent Supreme Court pronouncements
on the burden to be met by plaintiffs seeking to prove de jure segre-
to infer segregative intent. 573 F.2d at 143. Rather, it was believed that the Supreme Court
was concerned with the Fifth Circuit's apparent error in inferring discriminatory intent solely
from the segregative effect of a racially neutral policy. Thus, it was the Fifth Circuit's applica-
tion of the foreseeable consequence standard, rather than the standard itself, that was in-
valid. Id.
26 573 F.2d at 145.
Id. at 144.
Id. at 146. Although finding that the state's inaction did not constitute unconstitu-
tional conduct, the Arthur court reiterated the position taken in Hart that inaction, which
permits racial separation to continue, merely constitutes de facto segregation. Id. at 146; see
Hart v. Community School Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37, 48 (1975). This conclusion is of ques-
tionable validity, however, since inaction that is the product of rational choice constitutes a
form of action, and it is the intent of officials which provides the basis for a finding of
unconstitutional conduct. See Austin Independent School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S.
990, 991 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 230 (1973)
(Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580, 586
(1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975); Reading the Mind of the School Board, supra
note 5, at 330-31. Moreover, with respect to the state defendants the Arthur court appears to
have neglected to apply the test it promulgated earlier in its opinion. Rather than analyzing
the state's conduct in terms of the foreseeable consequences of its actions and omissions and
in the context of less segregative alternative policies available to the state officials, Judge
Smith simply found "that legitimate policy considerations warranted [state] hesitation in
intervening actively" in the Buffalo Public School System. 573 F.2d at 146. Thus, the foresee-
able consequence of the state's inaction was not used to create a rebuttable presumption of
intent, nor was a comparison with alternative policies undertaken to determine whether the
state utilized the least segregative choice in accomplishing its objectives.
The Arthur court also found that the state could not be held "derivatively" responsible
for school board actions under the standard established in Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362
(1976), since there was no evidence that the state expressly condoned the conduct of Buffalo
officials. 573 F.2d 146. Thus, the "direct link" required by Rizzo was absent. Id.
Although the Arthur court found that a discussion of the desegregation remedy to be
developed for the Buffalo public schools was unwarranted since the district court had not
issued a final order concerning remedy, the Second Circuit pointed out that "not only must
a remedy be appropriate to an infraction, but also that it can reach no further than the
incremental harm caused by the infraction itself." Id. at 147; see Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973),
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gation.25 The Supreme Court has stated that "invidious discrimina-
tory purpose may be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts"
and disproportionate impact is only one factor to be considered in
this inquiry. 0 In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous-
ing Development Corp.,31 the Court was faced with a challenge to
certain zoning practices of the Village of Arlington Heights.3 2 Stat-
ing that a critical analysis of the evidence is required before a find-
ing of invidious discriminatory intent will be found to be a
"motivating factor" in a given decision, 33 Justice Powell suggested
several evidentiary sources which may be utilized in this inquiry. 34
Thus, the "historical background of the decision," the "specific
sequence of events" preceeding the decision, "departures from the
normal procedural sequence" of the decisionmaking body and the
"legislative or administrative history" of the decision in the form of
statements of its members, minutes, and reports were considered
relevant.3 Implicit in these guidelines is the suggestion that the
See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977); Austin Independent School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976); Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). See generally Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977); see
also Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
"' Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
31 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
Id. at 265. Arlington Heights involved the denial of a request for rezoning which would
have permitted the construction of low and middle income housing in a Chicago suburb. Id.
at 255-58. Individuals who would have qualified to live in the proposed units and its developer
brought suit, alleging that the refusal was racially discriminatory and therefore violated the
fourteenth amendment. Id. at 257, 263-64. The Seventh Circuit held that the village's desire
to preserve the integrity of the zoning plan previously adopted for Arlington Heights was not
a sufficiently compelling state interest to permit the disproportionate impact on blacks that
the denial would have. 517 F.2d 409, 415 (7th Cir. 1975), reo'd, 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
429 U.S. at 266.
In commenting upon Arlington Heights, one author has noted that "because the court
undertook to develop this list [of guidelines pertinent to determining whether invidious racial
purpose motivated official action] and because seven of the eight justices who participated
in the case joined this part of the opinion, the list is likely to be an important guide in future
cases." Schwemm, supra note 2, at 1022.
1 429 U.S. at 267-68. The Court stated that the enumerated factors were merely indica-
tive of the inquiry that should be pursued to determine if unlawful segregative intent exists.
Id. at 268. Analyzing the evidence presented in Arlington Heights, the Court noted that the
impact of the zoning decision did "arguably bear more heavily on racial minorities." rd. at
269. Because the sequence of events preceding the denial for rezoning appeared to conform
to normal procedures, and the legislative history of the decision revealed reliance on criteria
usually considered by the board, however, the Court found that the plaintiffs had failed to
carry their burden. Id. at 269-70. In holding that the evidence did not support a finding of
illicit discriminatory purpose, the Court deemed the discriminatory impact of the village's
decision to be "without independent constitutional significance." Id. at 271. Justice White
dissented on the ground that the judgment should have been vacated and remanded to the
lower court for reconsideration in light of the Court's intervening decision in Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 429 U.S. at 272 (White, J., dissenting).
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concept of intent may not be adequately evaluated solely in terms
of objective criteria." Indeed, actual inquiry into the practices and
purposes of the decisionmaking body would provide the most salient
evidence of intent .3  The foreseeable consequence test, however, is
an objective standard which emphasizes the impact of official deci-
sions .3 Thus, to the extent that focusing on the foreseeable conse-
quences of decisions sidesteps an inquiry into the decisionmakers'
motivations and purposes, the Arthur test is incompatible with
Arlington Heights. 39
31 According to Professor Schwemm:
[Tihe Arlington Heights opinion not only used "purpose" and "intent" inter-
changeably, but also indicated that the crucial question is whether the discrimina-
tory intent or purpose was "a motivating factor" in the decision under review. This
choice of words, coupled with Justice Powell's observation that legislators and
administrators take many considerations into account in reaching their decisions,
suggests that a court may appropriately examine the subjective motives of official
decisionmakers as well as the objective consequences of their actions.
Schwemm, supra note 2, at 1021-22 (emphasis added); see Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman,
433 U.S. 406, 414 (1977).
The Supreme Court's decision in Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 428 (1977), a jury
selection discrimination suit decided shortly after Arlington Heights, initially appears to be
a retreat by the Court from its emphasis on purpose rather than impact. In Castaneda, the
Court stated that "once the [complaining party] has shown substantial underrepresentation
of his group, he has made out a prima facie case of discriminatory purpose, and the burden
shifts to the State to rebut that case." Id. at 495. In jury discrimination suits, however, "the
selection process should be completely random," thus making disproportionate impact a
more probative factor. See Schwemm, supra note 2, at 1022. As Professor Schwemm notes,
the variation in the standard utilized in Castaneda "reinforces the suggestion of Justice
Stevens in Davis, that the proof necessary to establish discriminatory purpose will vary in
different contexts." Id. at 1022 n.348. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
11 It should be noted that in analyzing intent, the Supreme Court has focused on the
purposes and motivations of the decision-making body, rather than on those of individual
officials. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
265 (1977).
1 A test for determining intent which focuses solely on the foreseeability of racially
segregative consequences has been criticized by several commentators as tending to obliterate
the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation. See, e.g., Omaha Presumption,
supra note 21, at 812; Reading the Mind of the School Board, supra note 5, at 329. A strict
foreseeable consequence test, in which intent is conclusively established once it is found that
school officials should have foreseen that segregation would be the result of a policy, does not
evaluate the purpose or intent behind a given action. In this vein, it has been noted that
"[tihe defendant may have foreseen consequences incidental to his action though such
action was undertaken for other purposes." Omaho Presumption, supra note 21, at 812.
Consequently, a test that utilizes foreseeable consequences alone fails to satisfy the require-
ment that intent to segregate be shown before unconstitutional conduct can be found. See
id.
" In a recent line of cases involving the Austin Independent School District, the Fifth
Circuit gradually retreated from sole reliance on an inference of segregative intent arising
from foreseeable consequences. See United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 467 F.2d 848 (5th
Cir. 1972) (en banc), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 532 F.2d 380 (5th Cir.), vacated and re-
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The validity of the Arthur court's standard for establishing a
prima facie case is undermined further when analyzed in light of the
stringent rebuttal burden placed on the defendant. While not very
detailed in its discussion, the Supreme Court has stated that proof
of discriminatory intent may be rebutted by evidence that the dis-
criminatory result was the product of racially neutral action." Thus,
manded per curiam sub nom. Austin Independent School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S.
990 (1976). In Austin, the plaintiffs challenged policies concerning the assignment of
Mexican-American students in the Austin Independent School District. 532 F.2d at 385. In
light of the Supreme Court's mandate in Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973),
that purpose or intent to segregate is essential to a finding of de jure segregation, the Fifth
Circuit rejected the impact standard it had previously utilized. 532 F.2d at 387-88; see United
States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 467 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1972) (en banc); Cisneros v. Corpus
Christi Independent School Dist., 467 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1972) (en banc), cert. denied, 413
U.S. 920 (1973). Nevertheless, the court stated that where a discriminatory effect is foreseea-
ble, segregative intent may be inferred. 532 F.2d at 388. Thus, since the foreseeable and
inevitable effect of using a neighborhood assignment policy in a residentially segregated
community was the maintenance of segregated schools, the court found a constitutional
violation. Id. at 392. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit in light of
Washington v. Davis. See Austin Independent School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990
(1976). Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion, suggested that the Fifth Circuit had erred in
"[imputing] to school officials a segregative intent far more pervasive than the evidence
justified." Id. at n.1 (Powell, J., concurring). On remand, the court reviewed the totality of
the defendant's conduct and utilized the specific factors propounded in Arlington Heights to
find that school officials acted with invidious discriminatory purpose. Austin Independent
School Dist. v. United States, 564 F.2d 162, 170-74 (5th Cir. 1977). Despite the court's retreat
from complete reliance on a foreseeable consequence approach, analysis of foreseeable conse-
quences was nevertheless endorsed as a valuable tool in evaluating evidence of intent. Id. at
168-69; see Austin Independent School Dist. v. United States, 579 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1978),
denying rehearing to 564 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1977).
Finding that the evidence of intentional segregation was pervasive, the court felt it
unnecessary to rely on a presumption of intent and the defendants, therefore, were not offered
an opportunity to rebut. 564 F.2d at 174. But see Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 n.21 (1977). Cf. Harkless v. Sweeney Independent School
Dist., 554 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977) .(Arlington Heights guide-
lines must be considered in evaluating evidence in suit for intentional employment discrimi-
nation brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976)).
It should be noted that while the objective approach may be of questionable validity, it
is also utilized by other circuits in determining whether official action was prompted by a
discriminatory purpose. See NAACP v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d 1042 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 997 (1977); United States v. School Dist., 541 F.2d 708 (8th Cir. 1976) (per
curiam), vacated and remanded per curiam, 433 U.S. 607 (1977); Oliver v. Michigan State
Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975). But cf. Williams
v. Anderson, 562 F.2d 1081, 1086 (8th Cir. 1977) (in employment discrimination suit brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), Arlington Heights factors considered in determining segrega-
tive intent).
" Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). The
Arlington Heights Court stated that to rebut a plaintiff's evidence of discriminatory intent,
the defendant must show "that the same decision would have resulted even had the imper-
missible purpose not been considered." Id. at 270 n.21. In Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976), the Court stated that the state must show that "permissible racially neutral selection
criteria and procedures have produced the monochromatic result." 426 U.S. at 241 (citing
1979]
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even assuming that the Supreme Court would allow a prima facie
case to be based on a presumtion of intent arising from foreseeable
consequences, it is clear that the defendant must be given the op-
portunity to rebut the presumption by showing that racial bias in
fact did not lead to a segregated school system. The Second Circuit,
however, circumscribes the defendant's ability to rebut by requiring
a showing that "no reasonable alternative policy would have
achieved the same permissible educational goals with less segrega-
tive effect." 1 Moreover, since this burden of rebuttal appears al-
most insurmountable, the Arthur standard virtually assures victory
to the plaintiff who merely comes forward with evidence of foresee-
able consequences. In effect, evidence of segregative impact is dis-
positive, a standard clearly rejected by the Supreme Court.
The Second Circuit's standard, which enables plaintiffs to es-
tablish a prima facie case of discriminatory intent more readily than
is possible under the Arlington Heights approach, 2 should aid in the
elimination of subtle state-imposed segregation. It would appear
that the foreseeable consequence test, and the presumption it pro-
duces, reflect a social policy judgment that official decisionmakers
should bear the responsibility for demonstrating the constitution-
ality of challenged actions.43 At issue in the development of stan-
Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972)). In Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S.
189 (1973), the Supreme Court espoused a similar burden of rebuttal, requiring only that
defendants "adduce proof sufficient to support a finding that segregative intent was not
among the factors that motivated their actions." Id. at 210. According to the Court, defen-
dants may show this by demonstrating that "a lesser degree of segregate schooling ... would
not have resulted even if the board had not acted as it did." Id. at 211. Thus, the evidence
necessary to rebut a prima facie case suggested in Davis, Arlington Heights, and Keyes,
appears to encompass subjective as well as objective evidence of intention.
' 573 F.2d at 143; see notes 17-27 and accompanying text supra. In contrast to the
stringent rebuttal burden placed on the defendant by the Second Circuit, the Sixth Circuit
has adopted a more lenient standard, requiring only that officials demonstrate that their
practices were a "consistent and resolute application of racially neutral policies." Oliver v.
Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178, 182 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963
(1975); NAACP v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d 1042, 1046 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
997 (1977); note 21 supra. Similarly, under the rule in the Eighth Circuit, a defendant can
dispell the presumption of intentional segregation by providing proof that the policies and
practices were not prompted by a discriminatory purpose. United States v. School Dist., 541
F.2d 708 (8th Cir. 1976) (per curiam), vacated and remanded per curiam, 433 U.S. 607 (1977).
"1 As one commentator has suggested:
[Ilmproper purpose is hard to prove, and Davis, Arlington Heights, and Castaneda
all demonstrate that an equal protection claimant will be hard pressed to establish
the necessary discriminatory racial purpose. The effect, if not the actual purpose
of these decisions will be to reduce the number of meritorious civil rights claims
that can be successfully brought under the equal protection clause.
Schwemm, supra note 2, at 1050-51. See also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
" See Note, "Intention" as a Requirement for De Jure School Segregation, 37 OHIo ST.
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dards through which the existence of intention segregation may be
ascertained, therefore, are not only evidentiary considerations, but
also fundamental assumptions concerning the obligation to elimi-
nate educational segregation." While the Second Circuit's standard
may be justified by social policy objectives, the rigorous rebuttal
burden placed on defendant officials may result in the imposition
of liability for conduct that was not prompted by invidious discrimi-
natory purpose. Since the Supreme Court has rejected the notion
that educational authorities should be liable under such circum-
stances, the exacting standard to which these officials are held in
the Second Circuit seems untenable.
Marea C. Mul6
L.J. 653, 668-69 (1976); Note, Foreseeable Consequence Test for De Jure Segregation, 50 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 329, 337-38 (1975).
" See Omaha Presumption, supra note 21, at 803.
